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CHAPTER 17.
DOES THE DIGITALIZATION OF SCIENCE AFFECT SCIENTIFIC VIRTUES?
MARKUS CHRISTEN
Introduction: Scientific Virtues and Digitalization
The emergence of science and scientific thinking in modern Europe
1
has been accompanied by the
development of a set of virtues that intend to characterize “good science” and “veritable scientists.”
Also denoted as “epistemic virtues,”
2
they are preached and practiced in order to know the world;
“they are norms that are internalized and enforced by appeal to ethical values, as well as to pragmatic
efficacy in securing knowledge.”
3
Scientific virtues are not stable entities across time and not clearly
separable from other kinds of virtues, which leads to the initial question in this essay: which scientific
virtues should be of interest? For example, should we refer to “high-level virtues” such as a well-
developed phronêsis, one of Aristotle’s four cardinal virtues? Certainly, this virtue is also critical
to practicing science; in order to produce sound scientific knowledge, scientists must be able to
deliberate well about their work and the work of others.
4
However, phronêsis as virtue covers a broad
spectrum of human activities and is thus beyond the scope of this short essay.
Instead, should we refer to a very fine-grained virtue ontology and focus on a broad set of virtue
candidates? Darcia Narvaez, Timothy Reilly, and colleagues created an impressive list of virtues
(broadly construed)
5
relevant for scientific inquiry, including caution (showing appropriate caution
with respect to various contingencies), collegiality (working with and for colleagues), foresight
(planning ahead and foreseeing possibilities), imagination (visualizing or conceptualizing abstract
entities), open-mindedness (being receptive to new ideas or information, especially that which goes
against conventional wisdom), and recognition (appreciating and valuing the contribution of others
to your work). Certainly, all those virtues refer to important demands for science (and for other types
of human collaborative endeavors)—but assessing such a long list would again exceed the aims of this
short essay.
1. Paolo Rossi, Die Geburt der Modernen Wissenschaft in Europa (München: Beck-Verlag, 1997).
2. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007).
3. Ibid., 40.
4. Jiin-Yu Chen, “Virtue and the Scientist: Using Virtue Ethics to Examine Science’s Ethical and Moral Challenges,” Science and
Engineering Ethics 21 (2015): 75–94.
5. Personal communication during the “Developing Virtues in the Practice of Science” project.
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Instead, I suggest focusing on six scientific virtues proposed by Pennock and O’Rourke
6
and
emerging from Pennock’s “Scientific Virtues Project.” These virtues directly refer to the basic
scientific goal of discovering empirical truths about the natural world. Pursuing this goal requires
distinctive traits that a scientist should cultivate; because of science’s special aims, curiosity and
intellectual honesty are the primary scientific virtues. Other virtues play important related roles.
Pennock and O’Rourke mention skepticism and objectivity as important scientific virtues. Moreover, as
repeatable empirical testing is not easy, especially when one must quantify results, perseverance and
meticulousness are valuable qualities for scientists.
As the aim of this essay is to assess the impact of changing scientific practices on scientific virtues
due to technological developments, my second question is: What influences the practice of science?
This is obviously a broadly discussed theme both within the history of science and the philosophy of
science on the nature and the causes of scientific change. Answering this question requires a reference
to both macro-scale sociological factors (work pioneered by scholars such as Joseph Ben-David
7
) as
well as micro-level, that is, the concrete work of scientists in experimental systems (see for example
the work of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger.)
8
The ongoing digital transformation likely impacts both the
macro- and micro-scale of scientific activity, as the second section will outline. Based on this short
general sketch of the nature of the current digital transformation, the third section will speculate
on the possible impact of the use of digital tools on these six virtues. A short conclusion outlines
potential positive and negative uses of new digital tools in the scientific practice with reference to the
cultivation of scientific virtues.
Digitalization: The Next Wave Driven by Machine Learning
Using digital tools in science is certainly not a new phenomenon. Beginning from the theoretical
and practical foundation of modern computation in the 1930s and 1940s, computers became an
indispensable tool for many scientific disciplines; they enabled “big science” and allowed for the
emergence of new fields that strongly relied on computer simulations.
9
On the broader societal
level, the application of information technology is not new, and resulting phenomena such as the
automation of production processes are well-studied.
10
However, the key differences between today’s
digital transformation and the previous use of computer technology result from the combination of
advances in the field of machine learning (ML), enormously increased data availability, and greatly
increased computing power. ML-generated artificial intelligence (AI) systems increasingly solve
problems where traditional computer programs fail. In contrast to explicitly written programs, new
types of AI systems (so-called deep learning algorithms) are trained by being exposed to a multitude
of examples and rewarded for making the right decisions. Their learning imitates human learning to
some degree, although the latter includes emotional engagement and purpose. Within a few years,
these advances have enabled AI systems to achieve impressive success in demanding and ambiguous
tasks such as image recognition, translation, radiological image analysis, and gaming. They not only
6. Robert T. Pennock and Michael O’Rourke, “Developing a Scientific Virtue-Based Approach to Science Ethics Training,” Science and
Engineering Ethics 23 (2017): 243–62.
7. Joseph Ben-David, Scientific Growth: Essays on the Social Organization and Ethos of Science (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1991).
8. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Toward a History of Epistemic Things (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
9. Markus Christen, Nikola Biller-Andorno, Berit Bringedal, Kevin Grimes, Julina Savulescu and Henrik Walter, “Ethical Challenges of
Simulation-Driven Big Neuroscience,” AJOB Neuroscience 7.1 (2016): 5–17.
10. Klaus Henning and Maike Süthoff, eds., Mensch und Automatisierung: Eine Bestandesaufnahme (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990).
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compete with human abilities, but also sometimes even surpass them. These techniques are improving
rapidly and lead to applications that were previously reserved only for people, such as driving
vehicles or diagnosing illnesses. AI thus becomes an enabling technology for an enormous range of
applications.
Figure 1. Sketching the changing societal embedding of algorithms
The associated change is profound because the way algorithms are embedded in social systems is
fundamentally changing, as Figure 1 illustrates. Until recently, people have explicitly defined the
algorithmically manageable problems, created the necessary programs top-down, and applied the
algorithms in clearly distinguishable areas. But now, large amounts of diverse data form the (often
only incompletely understood) basis of the problem context, machine learning generates the problem-
solving algorithm, which is then used in increasingly heterogenic and blurred application areas,
whereby the applications act increasingly autonomously and exchange information with each other.
Thus, the “feedback” between concrete problem solving by means of an algorithm in a defined area
of application and the resulting adaptation of the definition of the problem is increasingly happening
with limited or even without human control. The result is a gradual shift from decision support
through algorithms to the automation of decisions in areas relevant to life, such as lending, mobility,
legal examinations, or access to resources. Therefore, the public discussion about the application of
AI is often dominated by dystopian future scenarios.
11
Artificial intelligence is a branch of computer science that deals with the automation of intelligent
behavior using concepts from other disciplines such as neuroscience and cognitive science. Since
the concept of intelligence itself is relatively diverse, there is no clear scientific definition of AI. The
origins of AI go back to the 1950s, and this initial phase was marked by almost limitless expectations
about the capability of computers. This attitude was regularly criticized, and the high expectations
11. For an overview see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_risk_from_artificial_general_intelligence.
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raised by “old AI” have so far not been fulfilled. However, current technical innovations have changed
this assessment to a certain degree. Machine learning has become the basic technology for self-
driving cars, robot assistants, and the automation of non-trivial social, administrative, and economic
processes. Technological progress, the training of qualified practitioners, and competitive pressure
are accelerating the spread of AI.
Accordingly, various discourses have developed in recent years. These are briefly described below
because they provide orientation points for assessing the potential impact of AI and Big Data on
scientific practice:
The black box problem: In contrast to “classic” computer algorithms, the new ML
technologies—especially the so-called deep neural networks—use different programming techniques.
Instead of clear software structures, which are at least comprehensible in principle for the
programmer, a neural network is provided by the programmer, but its connectivity and weighting of
the connections change over an enormous number of training cycles (an image recognition algorithm
is trained with millions of images, for example). In the end, even the developers do not know how the
algorithm comes to the solution, because such ML models are equations that have no obvious physical
or logical basis. Therefore, certain AI algorithms appear as “black boxes,” a significant limitation for
practical applications of AI, provided there is an expectation that one understands how a system
comes to a decision.
12
When using AI for automated translation, the problem is probably irrelevant,
especially since determining the quality of a translation is simple, but if the system is to decide on a
customer’s creditworthiness, for example, both customers and users need to know what criteria the
system uses to make its decisions.
The bias problem: As Figure 1 illustrates, (big) data is the central resource for AI algorithms; this is
particularly true in the case of deep learning. Depending on the type of decision problem, however,
one-sidedness or biases can be hidden in the data, which then shape the behavior of the algorithm.
13
A
well-known example is that the Google search for “professional hair” returns mostly images of white
women, while the search for “unprofessional hair” shows primarily black women. This classification
reflects the bias hidden in the data. AI systems can even be manipulated and thus abused by means
of inappropriate learning data. In March 2016, a Microsoft experiment that ran a Twitter account
using artificial intelligence failed. The fictitious AI teenager began to tweet increasingly racist and
misogynistic statements after being deliberately influenced by a group of Twitter users. The bias
problem is relevant because the user is unlikely to be able to identify hidden one-sidedness in training
data sets consisting of a million units.
The fairness problem: Important questions arise not only with regard to the data, but also with
regard to the algorithms themselves, because these contain implicit normative assumptions and are
thus value-laden. Important parameters are defined by the developers and configured intentionally
or unintentionally by the users in such a way that certain values and interests are privileged over
others. This is relevant if AI systems are used, for example, to assess criminals. The problem of the
fairness of algorithms is complex, because given legal norms must be translated into a “language” that
computer programs can understand. For example, algorithms can be constructed in such a way that
they systematically ignore certain data characteristics (for example, information on gender or social
12. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2015).
13. Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson, and Arvind Narayanan, “Semantics Derived Automatically from Language Corpora Contain
Human-like Biases,” Science 356 (2017): 183–86.
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status), but this often influences the accuracy of the algorithm.
14
Other intuitions of fairness can be
“algorithmically packaged” in such a way that, for example, the proportion of classification errors
of the first and second order (X is falsely assigned or falsely not assigned to group Y) may not be
differentiated across discrimination-relevant groups.
15
However, mathematical considerations show
that certain ethically equally justifiable demands on algorithms (for example, regarding accuracy and
fairness) cannot be met simultaneously.
16
Thus, the designers are forced to make moral choices when
creating algorithms.
The problem of trust: In view of the problems described above, a paradoxical finding of psychological
research is that people apparently tend to trust the results of automated decision-making too much.
This manifests a basic problem of ML models that reveal correlation when it cannot be known
whether or not they reveal causation. There is a risk that decisions depending on these models
will be made with an illusion of security, even though they are only based on alleged connections
that are not causally secure. A study from Stanford, for example, shows that participants rated the
discriminatory employment recommendation of an algorithm as better and more neutral than the
same recommendation made by a human.
17
However, the reverse problem (algorithm aversion) is also
known: Studies show, for example, that evidence-based algorithms predict the future of certain types
of problems more accurately than human forecasters do. But when people have to decide whether to
use a human prognosticator or a statistical algorithm, they often choose the former—even when they
see that the latter exceeds human capability.
18
This is apparently because people lose confidence in
algorithmic procedures faster than in human forecasters. These studies point to a complex problem of
trust when people increasingly rely on automated decisions: there is evidence of both too much and
too little trust. This may indicate that a social practice for dealing with automated decisions has yet to
be established.
Economic effects: The economic consequences of digital change clearly occupy the largest place in
social discourse—and AI has a key role here in view of the enormously broad application potential.
In contrast to previous automation pushes, activities that previously seemed to be reserved for people
can now potentially be replaced. Some studies have predicted that up to 50 percent of all occupations
could be automated in the next twenty years
19
and even highly qualified work will not be spared.
Even though the extent of job losses is highly controversial
20
and the potential for creating new jobs is
unclear, hardly any occupational field of AI should remain unaffected, including science. Computers
and the internet have already redefined entire industries such as media, music, and travel; more are
likely to follow. And even if such economic upheavals have already taken place several times, they have
14. Moritz Hardt, Eric Price, and Nathan Srebro, “Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning” (2016), https://arxiv.org/abs/
1610.02413.
15. Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Matthew Joseph, Michael Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern, Seth Neel, and Aaron Roth, “A
Convex Framework for Fair Regression” (2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.02409v1.
16. Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Manish Raghavan, “Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores” (2016),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807v2.
17. Arthur Jago, “Technology and (in)discrimination,” paper presented at Psychology of Technology Conference, Berkeley, CA, 2017,
available at https://www.psychoftech.org/2017-schedule.
18. Berkeley J. Dietvorst, Joseph P. Simmons, and Cade Massey, “Algorithm Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms After
Seeing Them Err,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144.1 (2015): 114–26.
19. Carl Benedict Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible are Jobs to Computerisation?,” working
paper, 2013, https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf.
20. Max Rauner, “Die Pi-mal-Daumen-Studie,” Zeit Online, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/2017/11/kuenstliche-intelligenz-arbeitsmarkt-
jobs-roboter-arbeitsplaetze.
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always been accompanied by social unrest and crises. Given that modern information technologies
have produced considerable wealth for a rather small group of well-trained people and enormous
wealth for a very small group of the privileged,
21
the potential for social unrest is undoubtedly there.
The monopoly problem: Another economic problem complex concerns the relevant players in the
research and development of AI systems. Since the new forms of ML are strongly data-based,
companies with access to enormously large data sets have a competitive advantage. Leading
technology companies from China and the United States such as Alibaba, Amazon, Baidu, Facebook,
Google, and Microsoft are redesigning their internal business processes and products around AI.
The well-known “winner takes all” effect of the internet economy and the associated danger of
monopoly formation is likely to intensify in view of the large resources required for the development
of successful AI systems. This could make science increasingly dependent on large tech companies.
Geostrategic issues: A final, important point concerns geostrategic issues. China has defined AI as a
key element in its strategic goal of becoming a global leader in the development of new technologies.
At the same time, AI is a powerful instrument for supporting totalitarian efforts such as mass
surveillance of the population and “big nudging.” In 2020, China plans to introduce a nationwide
social credit system based on comprehensive monitoring and assessment of citizens by AI systems.
22
The question is to what extent the national application of AI technologies developed in societies with
divergent social norms and democratic traditions raises ethical or political problems. Military uses of
AI also fall within this complex of topics, and scientists are already warning of an “AI arms race.”
23
This is a dynamic that is difficult to understand and even more difficult to control.
This is an impressive list of issues related to the current digital transformation powered by AI and
Big Data—and they raise many questions far beyond this short essay. Nevertheless, let us take this list
as a framework for assessing the potential impact of using digital tools in science.
Digitalization of Science Impact Assessment: What Can We Expect?
We have to be aware of the pitfalls of the current discourse on the digital transformation of science
and society. Some claims are exaggerated and partly driven by the economic interests of either the
tech industry or the consultancy industry. Nevertheless, digital transformation is an ongoing process
that will likely affect the practice of science in many ways. Some recent examples illustrate this:
• The ability to analyze large, unstructured data sets will increase tremendously. Unlike earlier
attempts, “deep learning” systems do not need to be programmed with a human expert’s
knowledge. Instead, they learn on their own, often from large training data sets, until they can
see patterns and spot anomalies in data sets that are far larger and messier than human beings
can cope with. This can be used to greatly decrease the time needed in discovery processes, for
example when analyzing complex chemical reactions.
24
• Digital tools will also allow new ways of visualizing large data sets, including interactive
21. Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2014).
22. Felix Lee, “Die AAA-Bürger,” Zeit Online, 2017, http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2017-11/china-social-credit-system-
buergerbewertung.
23. Jürgen Altmann and Frank Sauer, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability,” Survival 59.5 (2017): 117–42.
24. Zachary W. Ulissi, Andrew J. Medford, Thomas Bligaard, and Jens K. Nørskov, "To Address Surface Reaction Network Complexity
Using Scaling Relations Machine Learning and DFT Calculations," Nature Communications 8 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1038/
ncomms14621.
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visualizations and embedded simulation tools to make immediate predictions.
25
• A startup called iris.ai creates exploration tools, starting from free-text description of the
problem and a result editor, to build a large corpus of documents related to the problem
statement with the aim of generating a precise reading list. In the long term, they want to build
an “AI scientist” that can create a hypothesis based on existing publications, run experiments
and simulations, and even publish papers on the results.
26
• This goal of a “robot scientist” has already been realized in genetics: At the University of
Wales at Aberystwyth, Ross King’s program “Adam” designed and ran genetics experiments.
Its successor “Eve,” at the University of Manchester, is designed to automate early-stage drug
development: drug screening, hit conformation, and cycles of hypothesis learning and testing.
27
• A team at IBM and colleagues has created a system that can generate scientific hypotheses
automatically by mining academic literature. Moreover, their algorithms, they say, can be used
to make new scientific discoveries. Their goal is to combine text mining with visualization and
analytics to identify facts and suggest hypotheses that are “new, interesting, testable and likely
to be true,”
28
• The system “Science Surveyor” uses algorithms to characterize the scientific literature on a
selected topic. Using the abstract and citations of a peer-reviewed paper, Science Surveyor
provides journalists context about that paper in several easy-to-read visualizations.
29
These examples show that digital support is or will be available for various aspects of scientific work
such as:
• Deciding what to read through systems that assess the importance of published scientific work
• Deciding which scientific question to assess through systems that are able to systematically
explore the “problem space” for interesting spots.
• Creating hypotheses through systems that can survey what has been published so far.
• Deciding on the originality of research questions through systems that gain semantic
understanding of what already has been explored (one could imagine some kind of higher-level
“plagiarism engine.”)
• Actually performing the experiments, or at least the repetitive, “boring” parts of some
experiments.
25. For an illustration, see the work and publications of the University of Washington Interactive Data Lab:
http://idl.cs.washington.edu/.
26. See https://iris.ai/.
27. Kevin Williams, Elizabeth Bilsland, Andrew Sparkes, Wayne Aubrey, Michael Young, Larisa N. Soldatova, Kurt De Grave, Jan
Ramon, Michaela de Clare, Worachart Sirawaraporn, Stephen G. Oliver, and Ross D. King, "Cheaper Faster Drug Development
Validated by the Repositioning of Drugs Against Neglected Tropical Diseases," Journal of the Royal Society–Interface 12 (2015),
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.1289.
28. Scott Spangler, Angela D. Wilkins, Benjamin J. Bachman, Meena Nagarajan, Tajhal Dayaram, Peter Haas, Sam Regenbogen, Curtis R.
Pickering, Austin Comer, Jeffrey N. Myers, Ioana Stanoi, Linda Kato, Ana Lelescu, Jacques J. Labrie, Neha Parikh, Andreas Martin
Lisewski, Lawrence Donehower, Ying Chen, and Olivier Lichtarge, "Automated Hypothesis Generation Based on Mining Scientific
Literature," paper presented at KDD 2014, New York, NY, August 24–27, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2623330.2623667.
29. See https://science-surveyor.github.io/.
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• Perform deductive reasoning based on the results generated in the experiments.
• Writing the papers (at least some sections with a high degree of standardization, such as the
methodology section) or ensuring that the text written by scientists is “machine readable” (that
it will be legible to the systems that automatically “read” them after publication and keep track
of the scientific literature body).
• Reviewing papers through systems that may assess novelty of findings or find shortcomings in
the argumentation or even data fraud.
• Deciding who would be a good collaboration partner through reputation systems that evaluate
the “match” of scientists or teams.
This list is not conclusive; all aspects of scientific practice can be shaped at least partly by digital tools.
However, as practicing science is the way scientific virtues are trained and shaped, I ask, how will
these digital tools affect those virtues? In the following, I will provide a (speculative) assessment of the
six virtues proposed by Pennock and O’Rourke using an evaluation framework that is based on the
issues of the general AI and big data discourse mentioned in the previous section.
How Virtues May be Affected by AI in Science
The first relevant scientific virtue is curiosity. Curious scientists want to discover something. They
want to find the answer to a question or they want to test whether some hypothesis is true. They have
the drive to find new interesting questions. In short, they want to know something about the world.
Although AI-supported digital tools lack the intrinsic motivation of generating knowledge about the
world,
30
they may indeed be used by scientists to explore a problem space systematically in a way
the single scientist never can do by himself or herself. One may say that curiosity is “externalized”
from the scientist to such a system; the scientist then would be less involved in the process of finding
questions, but is presented with questions that result from an externalized problem space exploration.
As finding new interesting questions is a competitive advantage in today’s science funding and career
system, curiosity as a virtue might be hampered, particularly in scientific fields, where the availability
of data allows for the construction of problem spaces. The problem of bias then could become
particularly relevant, as an incomplete problem space (whose incompleteness remains undiscovered)
could make relevant questions inaccessible for the AI system. Depending on what algorithms are used,
the black box issue may have some relevance (because the scientist does not necessarily see why the
system believes a certain question is promising); and in this way, the trust problem is intensified. As the
data sets need to be large for creating the problem space, in some fields the monopoly problem—that
is, the dependence of scientists on the data of large platform providers—could be relevant. Finally,
AI-driven problem-space exploration may also have the effect that creative thinkers would not be
attracted to science any longer.
The second key virtue is intellectual honesty, honesty in the acquisition, analysis, and transmission
of scientific ideas, theories, or models. The vices corresponding to this virtue, such as deliberately
ignoring facts, falsifying data, or plagiarism, are recognized as major problems for scientific
advancement. Here, AI systems, perhaps used in the peer review process, indeed have the potential
to support intellectual honesty by identifying scientists who infringe against this virtue. Used in
30. In the following, I do not discuss the speculation that AI may lead to a (self-conscious) “super-intelligence,” which may develop such
intrinsic motivations.
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this way as a control instrument, however, the digital tools would not directly enhance intellectual
honesty; they would be instruments to detect “sinners.” An obvious issue here is fairness, as it may be
opaque why a control system qualifies a certain scientist as intellectually dishonest. Some tools may
be used by intellectually honest scientists themselves, to check whether a seemingly new idea is indeed
original. However, whether using such tools in the process of becoming a scientist indeed supports
intellectual honesty might be questionable: the repeated experience that one’s own ideas are evaluated
to be “not original” by such systems (which is a likely scenario for students) may have unintended
effects, creating frustration and even the motivation to “trick” such systems.
The virtue of meticulousness might be most strongly affected by automating some aspects in
(experimental) science that are repetitive and “boring,” but such “boring” parts of practicing science
might be exactly what is needed to develop meticulousness. Thus, this virtue might eventually be
externalized to the machine. Furthermore, the issue of economic effects may come into play here, as AI
support systems may replace human workers in those repetitive or monotonous tasks where young
scientists get their first involvement in the actual practice of science.
The virtue of objectivity involves a lack of bias or prejudice when making scientific judgments as
well as the ability to make decisions based on facts rather than on personal feelings or beliefs. Digital
tools that would be used for hypothesis finding, deductive reasoning, or assessment of scientific
publications are likely to have a “flavor of objectivity,” and their use by scientists may indeed be
motivated by this virtue. Surely, the issues of bias (in the data) and fairness (of the algorithms) may
come into play here, depending on the concrete applications. A more interesting problem, however,
could be that the use of digital tools to increase objectivity may lead to an “exaggeration” of this
virtue by downplaying the diversity of ideas that is likely important for scientific progress. If a
well-constructed AI system relying on a large scientific database “decides” that a certain question is
the relevant one—who could argue against that? The use of AI tools may create high standards of
objectivity that undermine the chances to be wrong and learn through those mistakes.
The virtue of perseverance is important in a scientific culture where people know that progress
is slow and that many ideas do not work, and where frustration due to failure is common. The
various ways digital tools can be used indeed have the potential to make scientific practice much
more efficient (inducing the economic effects already mentioned)—and perseverance may lose much of
today’s importance in the scientific domains where those tools allow for substantial efficiency gains.
Whether this will actually be the case is hard to say, because one could imagine that a new type of
perseverance might become relevant—the perseverance necessary to make the digital tools work the
way they are expected to work. People dealing with complex software need a lot of patience until they
really understand their tools; the same might happen with the digital tools intended to make scientific
practice more efficient. However, people would then spend less time with the object of scientific
inquiry and more time with their support tools.
Finally, the virtue of skepticism could be affected by those tools as well, maybe as a side effect of
“over-enhanced” objectivity and the use of such tools as control instruments to detect intellectual
dishonesty. Obviously, the issue of trust comes into play here; whether the problem is too much or too
little trust will depend on the concrete application. One aspect to consider here, however, concerns
the geostrategic implications of a widespread promotion of AI applications for pursuing political goals
(“big nudging,” mass surveillance, and so forth.) Skepticism (and non-conformist behavior) is often the
target of such goals, and tools for evaluating the reputation of the work of a scientist may be turned
against the skeptical scientist.
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Conclusion
This brief outline is sketchy and needs more reflection, but it makes clear that there is reason to
believe that digital tools for scientists emerging from the progress in big data analytics and AI will
likely affect scientific virtues. The perspective here is rather critical with respect to the impact of AI
on those virtues. To what extent these potential dangers will be realized certainly remains an open
question—on the one hand, because the promises of the “new AI” may (once again) go unfulfilled,
as the usefulness of AI for complex scientific tasks remains limited. In such a scenario, AI systems
would be just one tool out of many, and thus not this technology, but other factors related to the social
conditions in which science is performed will likely have a stronger impact on scientific virtues.
On the other hand, the rise of AI in scientific practice is not an inevitable and deterministic
phenomenon. Human considerations do play a role and they have an impact on how we train and use
machine learning applied to various social domains.
31
The possibility that future scientists may have
“AI companions” supporting their research in various ways is not restricted to a purely instrumental
and uniform worldview. Depending on the use of this technology, it may also enhance pluralism in
thinking. If AI systems in the far future may indeed gain a degree of autonomy with respect to the
scientific ideas they suggest or the honesty they demand, they may remind us that scientific practice
can also be holistic and respectfully, relationally attuned to the natural world and to the autonomy of
other-than-humans.
32
But ensuring that the digitalization of science fosters scientific virtues demands
a reflective use of the digital tools that will likely change scientific practice tremendously.
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